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ABSTRACT 
The idea that agricultural subsidies are fully capitalized into farmland values forms the 
foundation  of  the  argument  that  subsidies  are  entitlements  and  removing  them  would 
drastically  reduce  farmland asset  values.  Surprisingly little  evidence  substantiates this 
claim.  Using field-level data and explicitly controlling for potentially confounding variables 
we find that landlords only capture between 14 – 24 cents of the marginal subsidy dollar.  
The duration of the rental arrangement has a substantial effect on the incidence.  Initially, 
landlords extract 44 cents of the marginal subsidy dollar, but the incidence falls by 1.5 
cents with each additional year of the rental arrangement.  This duration effect reveals that 
rental market frictions play an important role in the farmland rental market. 
 
Introduction 
In the twenty-first century, subsidized American farmers have gleaned, on average, $8,824 
annually in subsidy payments, making agricultural subsidies one of the largest per-capita 
transfer  programs  in  the  U.S.  Although  originally  motivated  by  equity  concerns,  farm 
subsidies  today  are  generally  considered  entitlements.1  According  to  conventional 
wisdom, since subsidies are fully capitalized into farmland values, the first generation of 
subsidy recipients reaped a windfall gain in the form of higher asset values, while all 
subsequent generations have purchased the “right” to agricultural subsidies by purchasing 
subsidy-inflated farmland.2  Recent evidence from farm-level data, however, indicates that 
only 23 to 64 cents of the marginal subsidy dollar gets capitalized into farmland values 
(Goodwin et al 2005; Kirwan 2009).  These estimates weaken, and at the low end of this 
range effectively eliminate, a primary rationale supporting transfer payments to American 
farmers. 
                                                        
1 Agricultural subsidies began in 1933, when average farm income was 32% of average non-farm income 
(Gardner, 1992), and aimed to give “agriculture a fair share in the national income” (Nourse et al 1937).  By 
1970 farm and non-farm income had essentially converged. 
2 Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe (1997) provide a historical perspective on the evolving justification for farm 
subsidies, emphasizing the ‘entitlement’ argument. 2 
 
  The fundamental unit in the theory of agricultural subsidy incidence is the plot of 
land  being  transacted,  i.e.,  the  field.    This  paper  augments  recent  farm-level  analysis 
focused on subsidy capitalization by using nationally representative field-level data to test 
the theory at the ultimate level of analysis.   These unique field-level data pair a field’s 
subsidy rate with its rental rate.  Farm-level analysis, in contrast, pair the farm-average 
rental rate to the farm-average per-acre subsidy.  Although previous analysis (Roberts et al 
2005, Kirwan 2009) used farm-level longitudinal data to control for farm-level unobserved 
heterogeneity,  the  incidence  question  fundamentally  calls  for  field-level  data  to  relate 
changes in the subsidy per acre to changes in the per-acre rental rate.  The farm-level 
incidence estimate may be biased downward if farmers own most of their subsidized acres 
and rent unsubsidized acres.  In the extreme case where no subsidized acres are rented, but 
the farmer owns subsidized acres, a farm-level analysis would estimate no relationship 
between  subsidy  changes  and  rental  rate  changes,  even  if  the  implicit  rental  rate  of 
subsidized acres rises one-for-one with the marginal subsidy dollar. 
  This paper overcomes the farm-level aggregation issue by bringing field-level data 
to bear on the question.  Using a nationally representative sample of soybean and rice 
fields, we find, similar to Kirwan (2009), that landlords extract less than one-quarter of the 
marginal  subsidy  dollar  through  higher  rental  rates.    These  findings  provide  further 
evidence that subsidies are not fully capitalized into the land values and, consequently, are 
not entitlements.  The findings also restore confidence in the usefulness of farm-level data 
to address important policy questions. 
This paper also attempts to explain why theory and evidence diverge substantially 
by examining the institutions surrounding the farmland rental market.  We find evidence 3 
 
that  landlords  are  typically  retired  and  often  depend  heavily  on  the  income  stream 
provided by the farmland, as if it were an annuity.  Evidence of thin rental markets, i.e., few 
tenants, combines with landlords’ inelastic demand for tenants to provide the marginal 
tenant with substantial bargaining power.    
The paper is structured as follows.  First, we search the historical literature for clues 
to answer the incidence question, and we highlight the importance and novelty of this 
approach by contrasting it with the previous research.  We explain the advantages of farm-
level data in the context of past research.  Next we examine the available evidence on the 
institutional structure of the farmland rental market.  We then develop our empirical model 
and perform the analysis, and finally we interpret the results in light of the institutions 
surrounding the farmland rental market. 
The Incidence Question 
  A  common  weakness  of  the  literature  is  the  inability  to  identify  the  effect  of 
subsidies.  This identification problem arises from estimating a fundamentally unidentified 
system.  Consider the standard workhorse model of farmland value determination:  the 
present  value  model  (e.g.,  Melichar,  1979;  Robison  et  al.,  1985).    Many  unknowns 
characterize the present value model.  The unknowns of greatest concern are the expected 
subsidy  stream,  the  discount  rate,  and  the  proportion  of  the  subsidy  that  becomes 
capitalized into the land value, i.e., the incidence.  The present value model, however, is a 
single  equation.    As  a  system,  the  present  value  model  of  land  price  determination  is 
underidentified.  No parameter of this system can be identified without further information 
or restriction on the other unknown parameters.  Typically, investigators assume (often 
implicitly)  that  the  entire  subsidy  dollar  gets  capitalized  into  the  land  value,  thereby 4 
 
restricting the incidence parameter to equal one. 
Ultimately, investigators have left unanswered the most policy-relevant question:  
what proportion of the marginal subsidy dollar is capitalized into land values?  The answer 
to  the  question  confirms  or  repudiates  the  conventional  wisdom  that  the  landowner 
primarily benefits from agricultural subsidies; it clarifies who benefits from agricultural 
subsidies and how much they benefit; and it supports or discredits the contention that 
subsidies  are  entitlements.    The  incidence  question  lays  the  groundwork  for  welfare 
analysis of agricultural subsidies and illustrates the distribution of subsidies.  Knowing the 
incidence  of  the  marginal  subsidy  dollar  enlightens  our  understanding  of  the  political 
process by illuminating the value transferred to key benefitting constituencies. 
To  study  the  incidence  question,  one  must  appropriately  deal  with  expected 
subsidies and the discount rate.  Roberts et al. (2003) and Kirwan (2009) demonstrate how 
to do this by focusing on the farmland rental market.  Because rental rates are per-period 
prices reflecting the productive value of agricultural land, this approach avoids making 
assumptions about expectations or the discount rate over future periods.  By focusing on 
farmland  rental  rates,  these  investigators  can  cleanly  estimate  the  incidence  without 
relying on strong assumptions about other key parameters. 
The Farmland Rental Market 
In the U.S., farmers rent 360 million acres of farmland, an area equal to 38 percent of 
all farmland and comparable to all the farmland in the 13 Corn Belt states.3  Table 1 reports 
statistics on the far mland rental market from the 1992, 1997, and 2002 Censuses of 
                                                        
3According to the 2002 Census of Agriculture, there are 361.7 million acres of farmland in Iowa, Indiana, 
Illinois, Ohio, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Missouri, Kentucky, and 
North Dakota. 5 
 
Agriculture.  In 2002, farmers paid $8.7 billion in cash rent, a 47% increase from 1992.  
This expense accounted for 11.3 percent of total production expenditures by renters.  At 
the same time the number of tenants dropped 25 percent while their farm sizes increased 
11 percent.   The importance of the farmland rental market cannot be overstated. 
  The farmland rental market is also an important market for subsidized land. The 
1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS) reveals that farmers 
rent a majority of cropland acres, which are the only type of land that is subsidized.  Data 
from the 1996 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) demonstrate that 45 
percent of subsidized acres are rented.   
According to the conventional wisdom, landowners are the primary beneficiaries of 
agricultural  subsidies.    In  the  U.S.,  non-farmer  landlords  own  87  percent  of  rented 
farmland.4  Since the vast majority of rented ,  subsidized land is likely owned by non -
farmers, the conventional wisdom implies a significant share of agricultural subsidies 
leaves the agricultural sector and accrues to non-farmer landlords. 
A New Approach 
  This paper overcomes the shortcoming of previous work by using novel, acreage-
level data to estimate the incidence of agricultural subsidies on farmland rental rates.  In 
2006, the USDA’s Agricultural and Resource Management Survey (ARMS) phase II survey of 
soybean and rice fields elicited information on rent paid and subsidy payments received on 
all cash-rented parcels of land.  The survey also obtained information on expected yields 
and historical rotations, which serve as powerful controls for land quality.  The data are 
                                                        
4 The 1999 AELOS data reveal that non-farmer landlords also own 55 million farmland acres that are not 
rented out and, presumably, are left unfarmed. 6 
 
unique in that they link subsidies to the specific cash-rented parcels to which the subsidies 
are tied.  Table 2 contains summary statistics from these data. 
  Table 2 illustrates some differences between soybean fields and rice fields.  Notably, 
the average rice-field rental rate is 30 percent higher than that of the average soybean field.  
This reflects both the higher yield, 41.6 bushels/acre of soybeans versus 72.7 bushels/acre 
of rice, and an historically higher price.  Rice acres receive substantially higher subsidies, 
too.  At nearly $60/acre, the average rice subsidy is 3½ times greater than the $17/acre 
average soybean subsidy.  Further contrasts are that the rice field is almost twice as likely 
to be harvested for seed, and the crop rotation for rice fields is evenly spread between a 
rice-soybean rotation, continuous rice, and a rice-fallow rotation.  In contrast most soybean 
fields are in a corn-soybean rotation.  Overall, the summary statistics suggest that rice and 
soybean fields are sufficiently distinct to warrant separate analysis. 
Empirical Strategy 
The model we use to estimate the incidence of agricultural subsidies on farmland 
rental rates is 
(1)     

r i   g i  X  i  f j  i
, 
where ri is the rental rate for field i.  The per-acre Direct Payment subsidy is gi,.  Xi is a 
vector  of  observable  covariates,  including  field-level  costs  and  returns.  Regional 
differences in production practices are accounted for by fj, a fixed effect for region j. 
  In  the  U.S.,  agricultural  subsidies  and  farmland  rental  rates  are  mechanically 
connected.  Agricultural subsidies are a function of program yield, a parameter that reflects 
the underlying productivity of the subsidized field.  Since more productive fields command 
a higher rental rate, the simple correlation between subsidies and rental rates not only 7 
 
reflects  the  causal  effect  of  subsidies,  but  it  also  incorporates  a  spurious,  positive 
mechanical relationship, resulting in upwardly biased incidence estimates. 
  Typically, a field’s underlying productivity is unobserved, and the econometrician 
has to resort to other methods to account for the spurious upward bias, e.g., fixed effects.  
The 2006 ARMS, however, explicitly asked farmers for their expected yield on the field.  
Presumably the farmer knows the field’s underlying productivity and bases his answer on 
this, thus providing an explicit measure of each field’s underlying productivity.  Armed with 
this  information,  we  account  for  the  spurious  mechanical  relationship  by  explicitly 
controlling for each field’s underlying productivity.  We thereby isolate the causal effect of 
subsidies on farmland rental rates. 
Results—Rental Rates Incidence 
  In light of the differences between rice and soybean fields illustrated in table 2, we 
initially  perform  the  analysis  separately  for  each  crop.    Results  from  this  analysis  are 
reported in tables 3 and 4.  Table 3 contains the results using the sample of soybean fields 
to estimate equation 1.  The first column reports the results of a simple bivariate regression 
of rental rates on subsidies.  At the field level, before controlling for any field characteristics 
we estimate an incidence of 0.45; in other words, rental rates increase by 45 cents with the 
marginal subsidy dollar.  Even the simple correlation rejects the conventional wisdom that 
the landlord extracts a substantial portion of the marginal subsidy dollar.  Controlling for 
observable  characteristics  of  the  soybean  fields  lowers  the  incidence  estimate  to  0.25.  
Accounting for region-specific unobserved heterogeneity with region fixed effects lowers 
the estimate to 0.24.  Interestingly, this estimate is nearly identical to that found by Kirwan 
(2009) using farm-level data. 8 
 
  Table 4 contains the results for the sample of rice fields.  Here the story is very much 
the same.  The bivariate relationship in column one is very different than the conventional 
wisdom, which posits the coefficient should equal 1.  Here, the coefficient is 0.16, but it is 
statistically  indistinguishable  from  zero.    Adding  covariates  to  control  for  field  level 
observable characteristics provides a statistically significant estimate of 0.19.  Including 
region fixed effects results in a still-significant 0.14.  This estimate is substantially smaller 
than  the  soybean-subsidy  incidence,  suggesting  that  differences  in  the  farmland-rental 
market structure could help explain the lower-than-expected incidence estimates. 
  Although the  soybean  and rice farmland  rental markets appear to  be  somewhat 
different, both reveal that landlords capture a surprisingly low portion of the marginal 
subsidy  dollar.    Table  5  combines  the  two  crops  into  a  single  analysis.    The  bivariate 
relationship  reveals  a  0.27  estimate;  the  estimate  falls  to  0.14  after  controlling  for 
observable field characteristics, and ultimately the combined analysis yields an incidence 
estimate of 0.08.  In any case, the conventional wisdom that landlords extract a substantial 
share of the marginal subsidy dollar appears to be wrong. 
Results—Net Returns 
  The analysis above establishes that 75 – 85 cents of the marginal subsidy dollar are 
not extracted by the landlord and are available for the tenant.  Whether the remaining 
subsidy  accrues  to  the  tenant  or  another  factor  of  production  owner,  however,  is  an 
empirical question.  Following the identification strategy outlined above, we examine the 
effect of the marginal subsidy dollar on tenants’ net returns, controlling for field quality 
and farming practices.  Column 4 of table 4 reports the results for soybean fields.  Sixty-
three  of  the  remaining  76  cents  are  retained  by  the  tenant  farmer.    Contrary  to 9 
 
conventional  wisdom and  standard  economic  theory,  the  vast  majority  of  the  marginal 
subsidy dollar stays with the tenant farmer. 
Discussion 
One  of  the  fundamental  assumptions  behind  the  standard  model  of  economic 
incidence is perfect competition.  Yet the farmland rental market might not be perfectly 
competitive.  Kirwan (2009) found evidence that tenants have some market power.  Market 
power may arise as farms grow larger and distance between parcels embodies transactions 
costs that could limit local competition.  Additionally, Young and Burke (2001) hypothesize 
that  social  norms  may  play  a  role  in  share-rent  contracts,  and  they  find  evidence 
supporting this hypothesis.  Examining the available data on the farmland rental market 
and the tenant-landlord relationship could inform us of the degree of market competition 
and the reasonableness of Young and Burke’s social norms hypothesis. 
Farmland Rental Market Frictions 
  The empirical results demonstrate the failure of the standard economic model to 
explain the farmland rental market.  As with many other markets, the perfect-information, 
frictionless-markets  assumptions  appear  untenable.    Explaining  the  incidence  results 
requires a closer look at the how the farmland rental market functions.  One exceptional 
characteristic  of  the  farmland  rental  market  is  the  longevity  of  tenant-landlord 
relationships.  Allen  and  Lueck  (2002)  report  an  11.5-year  average  tenant-landlord 
relationship duration in Nebraska and South Dakota.  In Illinois, Sotomayer, Ellinger, and 
Barry  (2000)  report  the  mean  tenant-landlord  relationship  duration  to  be  14.4  years.  
According to the 2006 ARMS data, the average rental duration among soybean producers is 
13 years, and the median duration is 10 years. 10 
 
  Long-lived  contracts  may  be  indicative  of  several  rental-market  frictions.    For 
instance, heterogeneous land and farmer quality might result in a matching problem.  Once 
tenants and landlords find a suitable match, the likelihood of separation will be low and 
decreasing with longer matches.  Alternatively, transactions costs could explain long-lived 
contracts,  but  the  separation  likelihood  would  increase  with  contract  length  as  fixed 
transactions costs are spread over a longer period. 
  We  explore  the  role  of  rental  arrangement  duration  in  the  incidence  findings 
introducing the duration of the landlord-tenant relationship into the model and interacting 
it with the subsidy measure.  Table 6 contains the results of this analysis.  Column 1 repeats 
the results from column 3 of table 3.  The rental duration has a substantial direct effect—
reducing the rental rate by 32 cents for every year of rental arrangement.  Adding only the 
rental duration, however, has no effect on the incidence estimate.  Interestingly, interacting 
the rental duration with the subsidy results in a substantial change to the direct incidence 
estimate, which nearly doubles to 0.44.  The direct effect of the rental duration becomes 
insignificant, while the interaction term is marginally significant with a p-value of 0.105.  
According to these estimates, the rental rate incidence falls by about 1.5 cents for every 
year of rental duration.  At the median duration (10 years) the rental rate is 15 cents 
(roughly 33 percent) lower than in the first year of a the rental arrangement. 
The Tenant-Landlord Relationship 
The tenant-landlord relationship is an important, yet relatively unstudied aspect of 
the  farmland  rental  market.  Allen  and  Lueck  (2002)  report  simple  contractual 
arrangements,  often  “sealed  with  a  handshake.”    Typically,  rental  contracts  are 
renegotiated  annually  (Allen  and  Lueck,  2002),  but,  as  noted  above,  tenant-landlord 11 
 
relationships  appear  to  be  quite  long-lived.  Little  more,  however,  is  known  of  the 
representative tenant-landlord relationship.  Nationally representative data do not exist to 
answer  fundamental  questions  such  as  the  following:    “How  do  tenants  and  landlords 
match?”;  “Why  are  tenant-landlord  relationships  so  long-lived?”;  and  “Do  rental  rates 
adjust annually, or only when there is a new tenant-landlord match?” 
Understanding  tenant  and  landlord  characteristics  can  facilitate  a  better 
understanding of tenant-landlord relationships.  As reported in Kirwan (2009), the average 
tenant  appears  to  farm  about  30  percent  more  land  than  the  typical  subsidized-crop 
producer.  Tenants are more profitable on average, earning 6 percent more per acre than 
the average farm, and they are 8 percentage points more likely to receive subsidies.    
Generally,  farmland  rental  contracts  are  between  a  farmer  and  a  non-farmer 
landlord; the 1999 AELOS, which surveys every landlord associated with a random sample 
of  farm  operators,  gives  a  glimpse  at  the  characteristics  of  non-farmer  landlords.    As 
reported in table 2, the median non-farmer landlord is retired (52 percent are), and nearly 
half (42 percent) of the  retired landlords are retired farmers.  The median  age among 
retired landlords is 74.  Figure 1 illustrates the importance of rental income as a share of 
total income by landlord type.  As illustrated in figure 1 and reported in table 2, rental 
income comprises more than half of total income for 11 percent of non-farmer landlords.  
Retired farmer landlords are particularly dependent on rental income; 29 percent of them 
derive over half of their income from renting out farmland.   
Another important characteristic of non-farmer landlords is their proximity to the 
rented land.  A majority (51 percent) of non-farmer landlords live within 5 miles of the land 
they rent out.  Nearly 70 percent live within 25 miles, and only 13 percent live more than 12 
 
150 miles away.  Although landlords generally live near their farmland, not all landlords 
are rural residents.  Forty-eight percent of all landlords live in a non-rural setting.  Thirty-
eight percent of all landlords live on a farm. 
These data provide some insight into the workings of the farmland rental market 
and the landlord-tenant relationship.  They indicate that landlords are close enough to their 
land and, since they are retired, have enough time to monitor the tenants’ use of the land.  
Landlords also might be subject to social norms as Young and Burke (2001) suggest.  Since 
most landlords are local, they likely interact with their tenants in other settings.  Because 
rental income can be a large share of landlord income, it is important for landlords to find a 
tenant rather than leave their land idle.  These characteristics suggest that tenants will 
have some bargaining power.  That power derives from the landlord’s social and search 
costs  associated  with  breaking  a  relationship  with  a  current  tenant  and  establishing  a 
relationship with a new one.  While such costs are likely bi-lateral, it is not difficult to 
imagine how these departures from perfect competition could allow tenants to extract a 
share of subsidy benefits. 
Conclusion 
  Economists have long suggested that agricultural subsidies become fully capitalized 
into  farmland  values,  and  that  subsidies  only  benefit  farmers  inasmuch  as  they  are 
landowners.  This rationale has lead to the argument that current landowners bought the 
“right” to the stream of subsidy payments when they paid for their land at subsidy-inflated 
prices.  In other words, by this line of thought, subsidies are entitlements.  This paper 
refutes that notion by demonstrating that the landowner captures only 14 – 24 cents of the 13 
 
marginal subsidy dollar.  Since subsidies have such a minor effect on farmland prices, the 
entitlement argument for continued agricultural subsidies falls. 
  This paper improves on previous analysis by using data at the appropriate level of 
aggregation and explicitly controlling for each field’s fundamental productivity, thereby 
overcoming omitted variable bias.  Subsidies are a positive function of the subsidized land’s 
underlying productivity, hence, failure to account for the land’s fundamental productivity 
results in an upward biased incidence estimate.  We explicitly control for the farmland’s 
underlying productivity by using farmers’ self-reported expected productivity of the field.  
Using  field-level  data,  which  is  commensurate  with  the  unit  of  analysis  in  standard 
incidence theory, we find that farmland rental rates for subsidized soybean fields increase 
by 24 cents with the marginal subsidy dollar, and subsidized rice field rental rates increase 
by only 14 cents. 
  To explain the low incidence estimate we look to the limited data on the farmland 
rental market.  Available evidence on tenant-landlord relationships indicates that landlords 
have a relatively inelastic demand for tenants.  Coupled with the increasing size of tenant 
farms, tenants appear to have substantial bargaining power, enabling them to extract most 
of the subsidy rents. 
In spite of the volume of research on the relationship between farmland values and 
agricultural  subsidies,  investigators,  hampered  by  conventional  wisdom  and  poor  data, 
have  not  adequately  addressed  one  of  the  most  fundamental  questions  of  agricultural 
policy analysis:  “how much of the marginal subsidy dollar accrues to the landowner?” This 
paper  answers  the  question  using  unique  data  that  overcome  several  endogeneity 14 
 
concerns.  We  also highlight the  need for more  data  on  the  farmland rental market to 
adequately explain the severe departure from economic theory. 15 
 
References 
Allen,  Douglas  W.  and  Dean  Lueck.  2002.  The  nature  of  the  farm:  contracts,  risk  and 
organization  in  Agriculture,  Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Massachusetts  Institute  of 
Technology Press. 
Goodwin,  Barry  K.,  Ashok  K.  Mishra,  and  François  Ortalo-Magné.  2005.  “Landowners' 
Riches: The Distribution of Agricultural Subsidies.” Working paper, February 2005. 
Kirwan, Barrett E. 2009. “The Incidence of U.S. Agricultural Subsidies on Farmland Rental 
Rates." Journal of Political Economy.  117(1). 
Just, Richard E., and John A. Miranowski. 1993. "Understanding farmland price changes." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75, (1) (Feb.): 156-68.  
Melichar,  Emanuel.  1979.  "Capital  gains  versus  current  income  in  the  farming  sector." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61, (5, Proceedings Issue) (Dec.): 1085-92.  
Orden, D., R. Paarlberg, and T. Roe. 1999. Policy Reform in American Agriculture. Chicago, IL: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Nourse, Edwin, Joseph Davis, and John Black.  1937.  Three Years of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration. Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution Press.   
Roberts, Michael J., Barrett Kirwan, and Jeffrey Hopkins. 2003. The incidence of 
government program payments on agricultural land rents: The challenges of 
identification. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85, (3): 762-9.  
Robison, L. J., D. A. Lins, and R. Venkataraman. 1985. Cash rents and land values in united-
states agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67, (4): 794-805. 
Sotomayer, N.L., P.N. Ellinger, and P.J. Barry.  2000. “Choice among Leasing Contracts in 
Farm Real Estate.” Agricultural Finance Review 60: 71-84. 
U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture.  1996.  Agricultural  Resource  and  Management  Survey 
(ARMS) ERS and NASS. Washington DC. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1999. Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey 
(AELOS) NASS. Washington DC. 16 
 
Young, H.P. and M.A. Burke.  2001.  “Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A 
Case Study of Illinois Agriculture.”  The American Economic Review 91 (June): 559-
573. 17 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 20 
 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 23 
 
 24 
 
 25 
 
 